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NEITHER INNOCENT NOR PROVEN GUILTY: THE A VIALL
SER VICES V. COOPER INDUSTRIES DILEMMA*
Jeannette Paull#
I. INTRODUCTION

In December of 2004, the Supreme Court settled a landmark issue
concerning liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability and Compensation Act of 1980 (hereinafter
"CERCLA").' Prior to this decision, parties who had voluntarily
cleaned up polluted land could recover some of their costs by suing
those who had also contributed to the pollution. In Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, the Supreme Court interpreted CERCLA to
require that these parties must now wait for the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") to order the cleanup before
they can recover any of their costs. This subjects parties to additional procedural requirements and creates a chilling effect on voluntary cleanup. Not only does the Court's decision in Aviallrun
contrary to the purpose of CERCLA, but it conflicts with well settled principals of tort and equity. There exists a dilemma for parties
looking to undertake a voluntary cleanup without losing millions
of dollars and without waiting years for enforcement.
This note will look at actions for cost recovery under § 107
of CERCLA as a solution to this problem, concluding that courts
should construe CERCLA to allow non-innocent parties to recover
the cost of voluntary cleanups without first being involved in litigation with EPA. This would encourage parties to undertake voluntary cleanups and eliminate many of the detrimental effects associated with delayed discovery of contaminated sites as well as

In the text of the following article, the CERCLA sections are referred to
by their section numbers before the law was codified. For accuracy, the US
Code section numbers are used in the footnotes.
#
The author is a 2005 graduate of both the MSEL and JD programs at
Vermont Law School in South Royalton, VT, where she was a member of the
Vermont Journal of Environmental Law. The author would like to thank Candi
Jones and Professor Martha Judy for their assistance on this article.
I
See Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Services, 543 U.S. 157 (2004)

32
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provide a remedy for parties that have voluntarily complied with
state and federal environmental laws.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Liability under CERCLA
When a private party such as an individual or corporation cleans
up a polluted site, it can cost millions of dollars. Cleanup costs under CERCLA have been as high as hundreds of millions of dollars
and may grow in the future due to the increasing occurrence of radioactive pollution. 2 In 1999, about ten per cent of existing Superfund sites were estimated to cost over fifty million dollars to
cleanup. 3 For example, California's Iron Mountain Mine, which
discharged an average of a ton a day of contaminants into the Upper Sacramento River, is projected to cost roughly 300 to 400 million dollars to clean-up. 4 The cost of remedying past contamination
can be extremely high and it is often not feasible for a private party
to bear the entire cost of a cleanup. Often, however, a cleanup can
cost as little as four or five million dollars
and it is advantageous
5
privately.
cleanups
conduct
to
for parties
Parties undertake cleanups for a variety of reasons. Frequently, private parties take on these expensive projects because
EPA has mandated them to do so under authority granted to it by
2

Robert C. Anderson, Economic Savings From Using Economic Incen-

tives ForEnvironmental Pollution Control, (U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Jun.
1999),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/incsave.nsf/437c451 fb25915d5852564db00579f0
1/279841 e 1867d8e01 85256636004fc56a!OpenDocument
3

KATHERINE N. PROBST, ET. AL, SUPERFUND'S FUTURE: WHAT WILL IT

COST? 8, Resources For the Future (2001). For FY 1999, results of a survey of
the ten EPA regions indicated that 112 out of a total of 1245 National Priorities
List (NPL) sites had projected costs of fifty million dollars or more. Id. For a
discussion of the NPL, see infra note 44.

4
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, (Oct. 9t', 2000),
http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/iron.htm. The Iron Mountain site was "the largest
point source of toxic metals in the United States, and the source of the most
acidic mine drainage in the world." Id.
5
Press Release, EPA & DOJ Recover $2.5 Million In Cleanup Costs at
New Hampshire Waste Site, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Aug. 8, 2003,
available at http://www.epa.gov/NE/pr/2003/aug/030805.html The JohnsManville site in Nashua, NH cost only 4.6 million dollars to clean up.
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CERCLA. 6 EPA will notify a party when it has learned of the contaminated site, and the party has an opportunity to enter into a settlement agreement with EPA.7 If the party does not want to settle
with EPA, then EPA may force the cleanup through judicial means
or it may grant an administrative order. 8 Nonetheless, once EPA
assigns liability to a party or group of parties, responsible parties
will be liable for the cost of cleaning up that site.
Parties who may be responsible for cleanup costs are
known as "covered persons" or "potentially responsible parties"
(PRPs). 9 Under §107(a), "covered persons" include 1) the present
owner or operator of a facility; 2) any person who owned or operated the facility at the time of the disposal; 3) any person who arranged for a disposal which incurred response costs or 4) any person who transported the waste for disposal to a site from which
there is a release or threatened release. 0 An entity which satisfies
any one of those four categories is potentially liable for costs of the
cleanup, known as response costs. Response costs are the costs of
remediation, removal and investigation of the site, and do not include lost profits, compensatory damages, or for the most part, attorney's fees."l
Often, a site can have hundreds of PRPs. 12 For example, the
National Oil Services site in West Haven, Connecticut has nearly
400 PRPs.' 3 National Oil Services was a waste oil treatment, storage and disposal facility that accepted waste oil from thousands of
customers for fifteen years. 14 PRPs in that case included not only
the owner of the facility, National Oil Services, but all those who
6

See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Li-

ability Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§9604, 9606, 9607 (West 2005).
7
See 42 U.S.C.A. §9622 (West 2005).
8
Id. at §9606.
9
Id. at §9607.
10
Id.
11

MCKENNA ET AL, SUPERFUND CLAIMS AND LITIGATION MANUAL, 138

(1990); see also Daniel Riesel, et. al, Private-PartyHazardousMaterial Litigation, SJ101 ALI-ABA 677, 681 (2004).

12

Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA Recovering More
of its Cleanup Costs at National Oil Services Superfund Site in West Haven,
Conn., Dec. 11, 2001, http://www.epa.gov/NE/pr/2001/dec/011207.html.
13
Id.
14

EPA Press Release, supra note 12.
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5
sent waste oil to National Oil Services' facility in West Haven.'
CERCLA's liability extends to any party that owned or operated
the site at any time, so any owner of the site can be liable.' 6 Liability also falls on any person that arranged for the disposal of waste
to the site, and on any person that transported that waste.' 7 At the
National Oil Services site, "[e]ach ... party will pay 8.5 cents per
gallon for each gallon of waste oil it sent to the site" because that
represents8 each PRPs relative contribution to the harm caused at
the site.'
34

1. Recovery of Response Costs
Where a party feels that it has wrongly incurred response
costs and that it is only liable for a certain portion of these often
There
astronomical costs, that party is not without recourse.
exist two different options for parties to recoup some of the expense of response costs. The first option is cost recovery under§
107(a). 19 Covered persons are liable for any other necessary response costs incurred by any other person.20 Both governmental
and private parties use this provision to sue responsible parties for
direct recovery of response costs. Some courts to hear the issue
have held that only a party that has not contributed in any way to
21
the contamination may use § 107. Other courts allow parties that
can successfully assert one of CERCLA's affirmative defenses to
use § 107.22 Others still allow non-innocent parties to use § 107.23
A second option is for parties to seek recovery of response
costs under § 113(f).24 Section 113(f) allows
15
16

17
18
19
20
21

Id.
42 U.S.C.A. §9607(a)(2005).

Id.

EPA Press Release, supra note 12.
42 U.S.C.A §9607(a)(2005).
Id. at (4)(B).
United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. 33 F.3d

96 (1st Circ. 1994).
22

Rumpke of Indiana, Inc. v. Cummins Engine, Inc. 107 F.3d 1235 (7th

Circ. 1997).
23
Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Industries, Inc. 891 F.Supp 221
(E.D. Penn 1995).
24
42 U.S.C.A. §9613 (f)(2005).
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any person ... [to] seek contribution
from any other person, who is liable
or may be liable under section
9607(a) . . .during or following any
civil action under section 9606... or
section 9607... In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties
using such equitable factors as 25the
court determines are appropriate.

In cases where parties sue for contribution under § 113, the court
will equitably allocate the costs among the responsible parties using whatever factors it deems relevant. 26 Prior to the Court's decision in Aviall, the circuits were split on whether a party must
commence an action under § 113 "during or following" any civil
action, or a party may sue for contribution at any time after it had
incurred response costs. After the 2004 decision, a party must
be
27
action.
113
§
a
filing
before
EPA
with
involved in litigation
Now that only parties that have been involved in litigation
with EPA may use § 113, the issue is whether non-innocent parties
that have not been involved with EPA, but have nonetheless in25
26

42 U.S.C.A. §9613 (2005).
U.S. v. Davis, 31 F.Supp.2d 45, 63 (D.R.I. 1998); U.S. v. Consolidation

Coal Co., 345 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2003); Centerior Service Co. v. Acme
Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 354 (6th Cir.1998), Boeing Co. v. Cascade Corp., 207 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d
706, 718 (8bh Cir. 2001). The Court will should weigh the following factors
when apportioning liability among parties: "the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to the site can be distinguished; the amount of hazardous waste involved; the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste involved;
the degree of involvement by the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of the hazardous waste; the degree of care exercised by
the parties with respect to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account
the characteristic of such waste; and the degree of cooperation by the parties
with federal, state or local officials to prevent any harm to the public health or
the environment." U.S. v. Davis, 31 F.Supp.2d at 63 (quoting H.R. 7020, 126
Cong. Rec. 26,779, 26781 (1980).
27
Aviall, 125 S.Ct. 577.

36
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curred response costs, may pursue action under § 107. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue.
2. The Aviall Dilemma
The Supreme Court held in Aviall that a party that is a
"covered person" within the meaning of § 107, but has not been
involved in litigation with EPA concernin§ that particular site, may
not use § 113(f) for a contribution action. 8 Neither may that party
use § 107(a)(4)(B) for cost recovery if that party has contributed in
any way to contamination. 29 Plaintiffs such as Aviall Services, Inc.,
that voluntarily undertake cleanup because they know they are
PRPs and will eventually be subject to litigation with EPA, can use
neither § 107 nor § 113. They are stuck with a multi-million dollar
bill because current law affords no remedy for parties in such a position. These parties are not innocent, but they have not been
proven guilty.
With the current state of the law, there is no remedy for
parties that choose not to wait for EPA to come to them, but make
a good faith effort to comply with solid and hazardous waste laws,
and to promote the health and welfare of the environment without
the coercion of EPA. This interpretation of CERCLA's provisions
veritably leaves private parties standing on courthouse steps wondering why compliance with state and federal environmental laws
has kept them out of court. The decision in Aviall has foreclosed a
group of would-be plaintiffs who deserve their day in court, which
can now only be corrected by allowing these parties to pursue cost
recovery under § 107.
B. Legislative History of CERCLA
Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 to "to provide for a national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites and to establish a
program for appropriate environmental response action to protect
public health and the environment from the dangers posed by such

28

Id.

29

Id.
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sites." 30 In so doing, Congress created under CERCLA a federal
cause of action that made responsible parties strictly liable for the
costs of cleaning up these sites. 31 The Act gained its moniker, "the
Superfund Act" because it established a 600 million dollar trust
fund known as the "Superfund," from which the EPA could draw
to clean up the sites. EPA generates the body of the trust from settlement agreements and litigation with responsible parties. The Act
functions to force parties to pay into the Superfund and allows
EPA to clean up other sites. When Congress established CERCLA,
it had two goals in mind: to protect public health and the environment by making polluters liable for response costs and to "induce
such persons to voluntarily pursue appropriate environmental32 response actions with respect to inactive hazardous waste sites."
1. Evolution of a Private Right of Action
The original cost recovery provision, as it appeared in the
1980 version of the Act was available pursuant to § 107(a)(4)(b).
That section provided that a PRP "shall be liable for... all costs of
removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe . .. [and] any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person."33 As Congress
originally intended, CERCLA was to provide governmental plaintiffs a way to conduct cleanups and recover the cost. 34 Eventually,
however, a private right of action developed under § 107. Because
the savings clause of § 107 dictates that "[n]othing in this subchapter... shall bar a cause of action that an owner or operator or any
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.S.C.A.N
6119. The national inventory to which the report refers is the National Contingency Plan.
31
C.E.R.C.L.A. of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§9601-26 (1980)).
32
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, supra note 30.
30

33

42 U.S.C.A. §9607(a)(4)(2005)(emphasis added).

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, supra note 30 at 17. See for example, N.Y. v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2 nd Cir. 1985). The Act was to "enable the [EPA] administrator to pursue rapid recovery of the costs incurred for
the costs of such actions undertaken by him from persons liable" Id. The costrecovery mechanism that existed at the time of CERCLA's passage was created
so that EPA could recover, not private parties. Id.
34

38
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other person subject to liability under this section... has or would
have, by reason of subrogation or otherwise against any person,"
private parties began to use the provision to recover from other
private parties. 35 Thus, some courts began to infer that Congress
intended any party, not just the government, to sue for cost recovery. 36 Courts interpreted § 107 to grant an implied cause of action
to non-governmental plaintiffs because the savings clause preserved such an action. 37 In 1985, the District Court of Colorado
applied the Restatement view ofjoint and several liability to infer a
right of contribution from § 107(e)(2) in State of Colorado v.
Asarco.38 The Asarco court held that Congress intended issues of
liability to be resolved using evolving principles of common law,
and thus the court should look to the Restatement view in order to
determine whether there is right to contribution among joint tortfeasors. Section 886A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "when two or more persons become liable in tort to the
same person for the same harm, there is a right of contribution
among them, even though judgment has not been recovered against
all or any of them., 39 The result of the inquiry was that "although
there is no statutory provision in CERCLA explicitly establishing a
right to contribution, § 107(e)(2) preserves claims for contribution. ' 4° Asarco articulated that Congress' original intent in drafting
42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2)(2005); Colorado v. ASARCO, 608 F.Supp.
1484 (D.Colo. 1985).
36
Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp. 670 F. Supp. 913
35

(N.D.Okl.,1987) (explaining that "[a]lthough CERCLA contains no explicit provision authorizing contribution, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(2) preserves such contribution claims to the extent that the common law provides a right to such actions .... Recent legislative developments indicate that Congress has considered
an amendment to CERCLA including an express right to contribution in order to
clarify confusion on the issue." (internal citations omitted)). See also, Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.,669 F: Supp. 1285,
1291( E.D.Pa.1987).
37
Colo. v. ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. at 1489.
38

Id.

39
Colo v. ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. at 1489 (quoting The Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1982)(emphasis added). Note, however, that the Restatement
(Second) Torts §886A has been superceded by the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Apportionment of Liability §23 (2000).
40

Colo. v. ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. at 1490.
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CERCLA was to hold parties that caused indivisible harm jointly
and severally liable for that harm.
2. The Arrival of an Express Right of Contribution
In 1986, after Asarco, Congress addressed the concern of
lower courts that there was no express cause of action for joint tortfeasors that had extinguished their liability against parties that had
contributed to contamination of the site and who had not paid any
of the response costs. 41 Congress reauthorized CERCLA and
amended it to reconcile the difference between the common law
and CERCLA's liability scheme by codifying an express right under § 113(f). In the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act (hereinafter "SARA"), Congress adopted a new vehicle for parties to recoup response costs:
an action for contribution under § 113(f).
The codification of a right that many courts had acknowledged existed before SARA gave any party an express cause of
action against any other party to force an equitable allocation of
response costs by the court.42 Section 113(f) shifted the duty to allocate costs from EPA to the courts. The provision took some of
the burden off of EPA by allowing the agency to name one PRP,
and assume that it is in the best interest of the PRP to implicate
others who may be partially or more responsible for response costs.
Where one of the goals of CERCLA is to force the polluter to pay,
contribution is a logical outgrowth of the original legislation because it is more likely to result in the equitable assignment of liability then if the determination were made at the agency level.
SARA was motivated by the need to
clarif[y] and confirm the right of a
person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable
41
42

H.R. Rep. 99-253 at 80, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862.
42 U.S.C.A §9613 (f)(2005). "In resolving contribution claims, the

court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." Id.

40
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parties, when the person believes that
it has assumed a share of the cleanup
or cost that may be greater than its
equitable share under the circumstances.43

In an effort to rectify the perceived inequity of polluters paying
more than their fair share of response costs, the lower courts
looked to federal common law that had long recognized a private
right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. 4 After SARA, the
jury has effectively been out as to which parties should use which
provisions. Aviall settled the issue of which parties must use § 113,
and forced the issue of whether the courts holding that PRPs may
not use §107 decided those cases correctly.
C. Actions for Cost Recovery
1. Prima Facie Case
In order to establish a prima facie case for cost recovery, a
party must make a showing that it is a PRP that has incurred response costs in the cleanup of a facility where there was a release
or threatened release, and that those response costs are not incon-

United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 33 F.3d
at 100 (1st Cir. 1994)(quoting S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985)
(internal citations omitted). It is important to note that here, the Senator expressed that parties held liable jointly and severally liable must have a right to
contribution, not that parties suing for contribution should be held jointly and
severally liable with other tortfeasors. When parties use §113 for contribution
actions, the courts will allocate response costs equitably.
44 Colo. v. ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. at 1489-90; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 90 (holding that "even though Congress
did not expressly create a contribution remedy, if its intent to do so may fairly be
inferred. . .an implied cause of action for contribution could be recognized.")
While the Northwest Airlines court declined to imply a right of contribution
from the statutes at issue in that case, the Equal Pay Act or Title VII, it is important to note this case recognized the court's willingness to do so where the legislative history and other circumstances permit. The court also pointed out that
most American jurisdictions have adopted this view.
43
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41

sistent with the National Contingency Plan.45 The defendant must
be one of the four types of PRPs covered by § 107(a).46 The site
must be a facility under § 101 (9).47 A release or imminent threat of
release of a hazardous substance into the environment must have
occurred at the facility. 48 The plaintiffmust have incurred response
costs necessary and consistent with the NCP. 49 If a party that has
unnecessarily borne the costs of another's actions and can satisfy

45

MCKENNA, ET. AL, SUPERFUND CLAIMS AND LrrIGATION MANUAL, 138

(1990); See also 42 U.S.C.A. §9605 (West 2005). As part of SARA, Congress
revised the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan (NCP),
which was originally codified under the Clean Water Act at 33 U.S.C.A.
1321(c)(2). The revised NCP was included to "establish the procedures and
standards for responding to hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants." Id. The NCP also mandated the establishment of the National Priorities
List (NPL), which assesses the "potential urgency" of particular cleanups. 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9605(8)(A) and (B)(West 2005).
46

McKENNA, ET. AL, supra note 45 at 138.

42 U.S.C.A. §9601(9)(2005) . A facility is defined as "any building,
structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a
sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft,
or any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any
consumer product in consumer use or any vessel." Id.
48
The term "hazardous substance" means a substance designated under
§1321 or §1317(a) of the Clean Water Act, under §102 of CERCLA, under
§3001 of RCRA, any air pollutant listed under § 112 of the Clean Air Act and
any substance on which the EPA Administrator has taken action pursuant to
§2606 of the Toxic Substances Control Act. 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(14). It is very
important to note that CERLA does not regulate releases of petroleum, or any
mixtures containing petroleum products. Thus, the term hazardous substance
does not include "petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under...
this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids,
liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas
and such synthetic gas)." Id.
49
BancAmerica Commercial Corp. and ASARCO, Inc. v. Trinity Ind.,
Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1427, 1451 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711,719-20 (2d Cir.1993)). "A private party response action will be considered 'consistent with the NCP' if the action, when
evaluated as a whole, is in substantial compliance with the applicable requirements . . . and results in a CERCLA-quality cleanup" 40 C.F.R.
§300.700(c)(3)(i)(West 2005)(emphasis added).

47

42
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the forgoing criteria, then that party may proceed under § 107.50
An action for cost recovery may be commenced as soon as the
party incurs response costs. 5 1 The action must be commenced
within three years after the completion of removal action and
within six years of the commencement of a remedial action.52
2. Liability Is Joint and Several
Under § 107(a), liability for response costs is strict, joint
and several. Congress imputed strict liability for response costs to
"assure that those who benefit financially from a commercial activity internalize the health and environmental costs of that activity
into the cost of doing business. 53 During the original Senate hearings in 1980, Assistant Attorney General for Land and Natural Resources testified that "joint and several liability... will encourage
generators of hazardous wastes to remedy hazards created in the
past as well as to discourage them creating new hazards." 54 Congress felt that a strict, joint and several liability scheme would best
serve the purposes of the Act: protecting public health and the environment and encouraging voluntary cleanup.

50
51

52

42 U.S.C.A. §9607(West 2005).
MCKENNA, ET. AL, supra note 45 at 138.
42 U.S.C.A. §9613 (g)(2)(2005). Removal and remedial actions are

authorized under §104(a). A removal action is the "cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment.. .such actions[ may be taken]
to monitor, assess and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as
may be necessary to mitigate damage...." 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(23). An action for
cost recovery may be commenced at any time after the incurrence of response
costs, within three years of the completion of any of the activities enumerated
under § 101(23). Remedial actions are those which are "taken consistent with
permanent remedy, taken instead of or in addition to removal actions...." Id.
Actions for cost recovery must be commenced within six years of the commencement of the remedial action, except for when the remedial action is commenced within three years of the removal action, then the costs may be recovered before the completion of that removal action. 42 U.S.C.A. §9613
(g)(2)(2005).
53
S. Rep. No. 96-848, 9 6th Cong. 2 nd Sess., July 13, 1980, reprinted in
SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 186, (The Environmental Law Inst. 1982).
54

7-J
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Strict, joint and several liability for toxic torts evolved from
several theories. Principles of equity dictate that joint tortfeasors
causing indivisible harm should be jointly and severally liable for
that harm.55 The liability scheme of § 107(a) is such that multiple
parties who were responsible for contamination of the same site at
different times may all be liable for response costs. 56 Thus, Congress adopted joint and several liability so that the response costs
could be allocated among parties, serving the ultimate goal of forcing the polluter to pay.
Congress focused primarily on strict liability, which makes
the polluter liable even absent a showing that the polluter's actions
fell below a certain standard of care. Congress drew from law governing product liability and the law of ultrahazardous activity to
determine that strict liability should be imposed.57 Subsequently,
courts have also applied strict, joint and several liability to allocate
harm in toxic tort cases. 58 In an action for cost recovery under §
107, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that there is a basis
for apportioning the harm. 59 Otherwise, the presumption is that the
harm is indivisible and strict, joint and several liability is imposed.
When a party can show that it incurred response costs due
to the release of a hazardous substance at its facility where another
party contributed to the contamination and has not paid any or
enough of the response cost, that party is entitled to sue for cost
recovery under § 107.60 The parties responsible for the contamination are held jointly and severally liable for response costs. Section
107(b) provides the affirmative defenses to liability, even though a

55
56

57
58

Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80 (1948).
See e.g., U.S. v. Chem-Dyne Corp. 572 F. Supp. 1258 (1983).
S. Rep. No. 96-848, supra note 53 at 187.
In U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum, the Court applied the Restatement view of

indivisible harm to the mixing of two or more hazardous wastes at a facility:
"where 'two or more causes have combined to bring about harm,' damages from
the harm are to be apportioned among the causes if 'there are distinct harms' or
'there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a
single harm."' U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. 315 F.3d 179, 185 (2d Cir.
2003)(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A (1965)).
59
Alcan, 315 F.3d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 2003).
60
See e.g. B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F. 3d. 505 (2d. Cir. 1996);
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (1 1t ' Cir. 1996).

44
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party is a "covered person". 6 1 Most jurisdictions allow parties that
can successfully assert one of those defenses to pursue actions for
cost recovery since those parties are in a position of relative innocence. However, if the party has caused more than a de minimus
amount of the contamination, then that party is foreclosed from
remedy without litigation or settlement.
D. Innocence as a Standard: Can Non-Innocent Parties Use §
107?
There are varying approaches to whether a party may use §
107's cost recovery provision to regain response costs. Some jurisdictions hold that non-innocent parties may not use § 107, while
others hold that parties that may be innocent can use § 107.62
Courts will generally look to the "gist" or "nature" of a party's
claim to determine whether it is inherently one for contribution or
for cost recovery. 63
1. A Non-Innocent Party May Not Use § 107
The general rule is that if a polluter is himself one of the
parties enumerated under § 107(a) or he is subject to a § 106 order,
then he may not proceed under § 107(a). 64 Some federal district
courts have held, however, that a PRP may also proceed under §
107(a). 65 The
First,have
Second,
Sixth,responsible
Ninth, Tenth,
and
Eleventh
Circuits
held Third,
that "aFourth,
potentially
person
61
62

42 U.S.C.A. §9107(b)(2005).
Newcastle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 ( 3 d

Cir. 1997); Rumpke of Indiana v. Cummins Engine Comp., 107 F.3d at 1240.
63
Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7"h Cir. 1994).
64
United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. 33 F.3d
96, 99-100 (1st Cir. 1994); see also U.S. v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., Co. 50
F.3d. 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F. 3d 1489,1496 (11' h Cir. 1996); New Castle County v. Halliburton
NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120 ( 3rd Cir. 1997); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298 (9d' Cir. 1997); Bedford and Affiliates v.
Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 425 ( 2nd Cir. 1998); Morrison Enterprises v. McShares, Inc.,
302 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2002).
65
Jos6 R. Allen, Private Party Litigation under Superfund: Claims for
Cost Recovery and Contribution, SJ065 ALI-ABA 193, 205-06 (2004).
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under § 107(a) that is not entitled to any of the defenses enumerated under §107(b)... cannot maintain a § 107(a) action against
another potentially responsible person." 66
New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp. represents
the view that partially guilty parties must use § 113.67 In Newcastle,
the operator of a landfill, New Castle County, alleged that under §
107(a)(4)(B), NUS was liable for response costs incurred due to
the improper installation a monitoring well pursuant to an EPA
consent decree. 68 The Third Circuit upheld the lower court's dismissal of the case, reasoning that there is an important difference
between cost recovery and contribution, and that New Castle
County could not pursue an action for cost recovery. Under New
Castle, an action for cost recovery is appropriate where a party has
wrongly incurred response costs and may sue to regain all of the
costs. 69 If the party is partially guilty, then it is not suing for recovery of all of its costs, but for an equitable allocation of its costs between itself and other guilty parties. Such an action is one which is
better suited to an action for contribution, reasoned the New Castle
court.7 °

According this view, a PRP who has not asserted one of the
defenses to liability may not sue for cost recovery, but must pursue
an action to recover only the equitable share of its costs under §
113(f). This is because only a blameless party is entitled to joint
and several liability, but a party that assumes part of the fault is
entitled to several liability only.
2. A Non-Innocent Party May Use § 107
a. Potential Innocence Sufficient
The Seventh Circuit allows a PRP to commence action under § 107(a)(4) when the party is essentially innocent with respect
66
67

68
69
70
71

Bedford v. Sills, 156 F.3d at 425.
New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1120-23.

Id.
Id. at 1122.

Id.
Id.
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to the contamination, but have otherwise complied with § 107(a).72
CERCLA offers a host of defenses that insulate parties from being
liable for response costs, and ostensibly puts that party into the position of relative "innocence." The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in Rumpke of Indiana v. Cummins Engine Company,
that a party asserting one of these defenses may pursue an action
for cost recovery under § 107(a). In Rumpke, plaintiffs purchased a
landfill, and without conducting any tests on the land, relied on the
seller's word that the seller had never disposed of any hazardous
wastes on the site. 73 In fact, several fifty-five gallon drums of
Volatile Organic Compounds ("VOC's") from the neighboring
corporation were found in the landfill.7 4 Rumpke was liable as a
PRP because it was the current owner of the facility, and could not
assert the "innocent landowner" defense because it did not exercise
due diligence in determining whether there was contamination at
the facility. 75 Because the seller corporation had since been dissolved, Rumpke sued Cummins Engine for its contribution to the
response costs liability.76 The court held that a consent decree entered into by the seller did not relieve Cummins of liability.77 Thus,
the court turned to the issue of whether Rumpke could sue under §
107 because it had not contributed to the contamination caused by
the fifty-five gallon drums of VOC's that ended up in the landfill.
The Rumpke court held that a landowner that alleges it did not polRumpke, 107 F. 3d at 1240.
Id. at 1236.
74
Id.
75
Id; See also 42 U.S.C.A. §9601(35)(2005). The innocent landowner
defense requires that parties exercise due diligence in purchasing the property,
but taking "all appropriate inquiry" into whether or not the land is contaminated.
Id.
76
Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1237.
77
Before it's dissolution, Seymour had entered into a consent decree with
EPA under § 122, and received settlement protection pursuant to §113(f)(2). Section 113(f)(2) provides that "[a] person who has resolved it's liability to the
United States or a state in an administrative or judicially approved settlement
shall not be liable for contribution for matters addressed in the settlement." The
court examined whether the settlement protection was valid to protect Cummins
from contribution liability to a third party, not a state or the United States government and held that it was not. Rumpke, 107 F. 3d at 1241; 42 U.S.C.A.
§§9622, 9613(f)(2)(West 2005).
72

73
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lute the site in any way may sue for direct response costs under §
107(a).78
The Seventh Circuit represents courts holding that a PRP
may sue under § 107(a) for cost recovery, but only where that
party has not contributed in any way to the contamination for
which the response costs at issue are incurred, and where those
costs have not been the subject of an EPA consent decree.
b. Non-innocence Sufficient
While many courts have held that non-innocent parties are
limited to actions for contribution under § 113(f), there is a substantial body of case law that permits non-innocent parties to proceed under § 107. 79 In Bethlehem Iron Works v. Lewis Industries,
the court held that a PRP that had not been subject to "any judgment, consent decree or other agreement with the state or federal
government concerning" the subject of the instant litigation could
pursue an action to recover its costs under § 107.80 Bethlehem Iron
Id.
Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc, 891 F. Supp. 221
(E.D. Penn. 1995) (holding that CERCLA impliedly authorized an action for
cost recovery, even where plaintiff was a PRP); see also Charter Township of
Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid, 910 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Mich. 1995)(holding
that private parties, who were themselves PRP's, were not limited to actions for
contribution under §113, but could use § 107); Transp. Leasing Co. v. State of
Cal. (CalTrans), 861 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1993); U.S. v. SCA Services of
Ind., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264, 1271 (N.D.Ind. 1994) (stating in dicta that "[s]uch
an interpretation does not necessarily obliterate the private cost recovery action
set forth in Section 107(a)(4)(B), which may yet be, perhaps appropriately,
available to persons who voluntarily embark on a response plan without waiting
for the Government to spur them into action."); U.S. v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp.
397, 416 (D. N. J. 1991) (holding that a governmental plaintiff may use §107
even though it was a PRP and that §107 requires the equitable allocation of liability traditionally employed under §113). But see, United Technologies Corp.
v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. 33 F.3d 96 (Ist Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Colo. & E.
R.R., Co. 50 F.3d. 1530 (10th Cir. 1995); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland
Apartments, 94 F. 3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996); New Castle County v. Halliburton
NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997); Bedford and Affiliates v. Sills, 156
F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1998); Morrison Ent. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127 ( 10 th
Cir. 2002).
80
Bethlehem Iron Works v. Lewis, 891 F.Supp at 222.
78

79
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Works, successor corporation to defendant's steel fabrication facility, operated the facility for two years before it undertook a three
million dollar, voluntary cleanup. 81 The court upheld Bethlehem's
§ 107 claim, finding "no indication" in the text of § 107 that prohibited PRP's from bringing such an action, while expressly declining to follow established case law to the contrary. 82The court
in Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid held that
even a party that had entered into consent decree and certainly
"could have brought a contribution action under § 113," could pursue an action for direct cost recovery under § 107.83

III. THE A VIALL

DECISION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

A. The Aviall Dilemma
The Aviall dilemma characterizes a group of plaintiffs in a difficult
position. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, Aviall represented
the approach taken by courts that allowed non-innocent parties undertaking voluntary cleanups to file a § 113 action that was not
"during orfollowing" a civil action.84 A guilty party not subject to
judicial or administrative action by EPA, which has incurred response costs consistent with the NCP, may sue other PRPs under §
113.85 Aviall Services was a successor corporation of Cooper Industries, an aircraft engine maintenance company in Dallas,
Texas. 86 Shortly after purchasing Cooper's property, Aviall realized the land was contaminated and reported that contamination to
the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission
("TNRCC").87 TNRCC informed Aviall that it was in violation of
Texas state environmental laws. 88 EPA was not aware of the contaminated site at any time, and did not commence any type of reId.
Id. at 225.
83
Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid, 910 F. Supp. at 334.
Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 136 (5th Cir.
84
2001)(emphasis supplied).
85
Id. at 154.
86
Id. at 136.
Id.
87
88
Id.
81
82
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sponse or remedial action. 89 Soon after TNRCC notified Aviall,
90
Aviall voluntarily began a multi-million dollar, ten year cleanup.
In order to recover some of the costs for the cleanup, Aviall sued
Cooper for contribution under § 113(f). 91
The district court it granted summary judgment for Cooper,
holding that Aviall could not proceed under § 113(f) absent judicial or administrative action by EPA.92 Section 113(f) says "any
person may seek contribution from any person who isliable or potentially liable during or following any civil action under section
[1]06... or section [1]07" and "[n]othing inthis subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to bring action for contribution in
the absence of a civil action under section [1]06. . .or section
[1]07." 9'The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas interpreted the term "may" inthe enabling clause as a mandatory "may"," meaning "shall" or "must," that created "an exclusive cause of action."9a This interpretation means that a party may
only bring an action for contribution during or following action
under § 106 or 107(a). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. 95 The Fifth Circuit rejected Aviall's argument that § 113's savings clause preserved Aviall's claim, even though Aviall had not brought its contribution action during or following any civil action. The court reasoned that Aviall's interpretation of § 113's savings clause would
render the enabling clause superfluous, and that the savings clause
was more likely intended to preserve claims available under state
laws. 96
An en banc majority overturned this decision, finding no
97
basis for the narrow interpretation of § 113(f)'s savings clause.
89

Id.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 134. Aviall originally sued for cost recovery under § 107(a)(4)(B),
however it amended its complaint to ask for contribution and other remedies at
Texas state law.
92
Aviall Services. v. Cooper Indus., 312 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 2002).
93
42 U.S.C.A. §9613(f)(2005)(emphasis added).
94
Aviall, 263 F.3d at 138
95
Aviall, 263 F.3d at 134.
96
Id. at 140.
97
Aviall, 312 F. 3d 677 at 686.
90
91
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While finding that "reasonable minds can differ over the interpretation of section 113(f)(1), because its syntax is confused, its
grammar inexact and its relationship to other CERCLA provisions
ambiguous," the court ultimately held that the legislative history of
CERCLA supports the right of contribution between PRPs. 98 Further, the "may" is not a mandatory, but a permissive "may," and
not an "exclusive" cause of action and the PRP may brinw the
claim at any time before, during or following a civil action.9 The
court reasoned that if Congress had intended to make contribution
available to only parties subject to administrative or judicial action,
then it would have done so.' 00 The en banc majority rejected the
dissent's argument that the savings clause and the enabling clause
were in conflict because the permissive "may" is consistent with
the savings clause.' 0 ' The majority held in favor of Aviall, allowby a guilty party, absent a civil action
ing action for contribution
02
under CERCLA.1
The Supreme Court finally put this dispute to rest when it
held in December of 2004, that the may is not permissive, but
mandatory, and that parties are confined to bringing § 113 actions
"during or following" § 107 or § 106 actions.' In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court reasoned that the permissive
"may" would render equally superfluous both the provision itself
and the ability for parties to undertake actions for contribution after
settlement with EPA.10 4 "There is no reason why Congress would
bother to specify conditions under which a person may bring a
contribution claim, and at the same time allow contribution actions
absent those conditions."' 1 5 The majority rejected the argument
that the savings clause maintained a cause of action for contribution, even without a "civil action."' 6 Thus, the Court held that
even though § 113 reads that "nothing in this subsection shall di98
99

1o0
101
102
103
104
105
106

Aviall, 312 F.3d 677 at 681.
Id.
Id. at 686.
Id. at 687, 692, Garza, J., dissenting.
Aviall, 312 F.3d 677.
Aviall,125 S.Ct. 577, 579.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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minish the right to bring an action under § 107 in the absence of a
civil action," the absence of a civil action does not just diminish,
but eradicates, the right to bring action under § 113.107 The Court
expressly denied the relevance of CERCLA's purpose,08 claiming
that each side used the purpose to fortify its own cause.1
In a brief dissent, Ginsburg, J., joined by Stevens, J. argued that § 107 would have been an appropriate avenue for Aviall
to have taken under circumstances; because of the precedent set by
the Fifth Circuit and also because § 107 creates an express cause of
action for PRPs to recoup their costs. 10 9 While the minority declined to take a definitive position on whether Aviall would have
been able to assert a claim under § 107, it hinted at the fact that
even though Aviall was not wholly innocent, the law should not
bar from recovery a party in such a position.
The dissent relied heavily on Key-Tronic Corp. v. United
States, when it reasoned that § 107 provides an implied cause of
action for PRPs to recover from other PRPs. 0 In Key-Tronic, petitioners Key-Tronic Corporation were one of several PRPs that
caused the contamination of a landfill. Key-Tronic incurred 1.2
million dollars in response costs and entered into a 4.2 million dollar settlement with EPA and the Washington Department of Ecology."' l Key-Tronic brought an action for recovery of the 1.2 million dollars in response costs, because it had incurred such costs
before settling with EPA. The court allowed Key-Tronic to pursue
its claim under § 107 because "§ 107 unquestionably provides a
cause of action for private parties to seek recovery of cleanup
costs.""12 Even though Key-Tronic had participated in the contamination of the landfill, the Supreme Court held that it could purany
person lisue an action for cost recovery because § 107 made 11
3
costs.
response
incurred
that
person
able to any other

107

108
109
110

42 U.S.C.A. §9613 (2005).
Aviall, 125 S.Ct. at 584.
Id. at 586-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Aviall, 125 S.Ct at 586-87 (citing Key-Tronic, Corp. v. U.S., 511 U.S.

809, 818(1994)).
III
Key-Tronic, 511 U.S. at 811.
Id. at 818.
112
113

Id.
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Ginsburg's dissent in Aviall relies on Key-Tronic to indicate that had the court been properly briefed on the issue, it may4
have decided the merits of Aviall Services' cost recovery claim."
Specifically, the dissent argues that the court should have decided
in favor of Aviall, that it could have pursued action under § 107.1 15
Even the majority admitted that it was not prepared to take a position on the § 107 issue, but it was not willing to foreclose completely the possibility that § 107 could be a vehicle for PRPs to recover their costs. 116 "In addition to leaving open whether Aviall
may seek cost recovery under § 107 . ..we decline to decide
whether Aviall has an implied right to contribution under §
107.,,117 The majority narrowed the scope of Key-Tronic's application:
we did not address the relevance, if
any, of Key-Tronic's status as a PRP
or confront the relationship between
§§ 107 and 113. In discussing § 107,
we did not even classify it precisely
as a right of cost recovery or a right
of contribution, as the dissent's 8descriptions of the decision reveal. 18
Thus, while the majority agrees with the dissent that there is insufficient briefing to look further into the § 107 issue, it cuts back significantly the application of Key-Tronic. The majority opinion limited Key-Tronic's application to Aviall by pointing out that its
opinion in that case did not speak directly to the issue of KeyTronic's status as a PRP or the relationship between the two provisions. Both opinions left the question wide open as to whether parties PRPs can use § 107 to recover their costs.
B. A Critique

115

Aviall, 125 S.Ct. at 588.
Id. at 586-88

116

Id. at 585

117
118

Id.
Id. at 585.

114
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1. After Aviall

The Aviall decision has raised the issue of whether PRPs
may use § 107 in actions for cost recovery. Although the general
rule is that guilty, or non-innocent parties, must use § 113, many
courts made these decisions when § 113 was available as a remedy
for all PRPs.11 9 In Newcastle v. Halliburton, the court held that
non-innocent parties should not be allowed to proceed under § 107
because "such reading would enable § 107 to swallow § 113, thus
nullifying the three-year statute of limitations associated with actions for contribution."' 120 Fearing that "potentially responsible persons would quickly abandon § 113 in favor of the substantially
more generous provisions of § 107," the court refused to "read §
107 so broadly that § 113 ceases to have any meaningful application." 121 The Court in U.S. v. Colorado & Eastern expressed similar concerns that if "PRPs were allowed to recover expenditures
incurred in cleanup and remediation from other PRPs under §
107's strict liability scheme, § 113 would be rendered meaningless.', 122 The feeling from many courts holding that PRPs could not
use § 107, was that parties would be able to choose the more desirable provisions based on considerations such as statutes of limitation and § 107's "more generous" allocation of response costs. 123
This is no longer the case. After Aviall, there is no choice
between § 113 and § 107: if the party commences its suit during or
following a civil action under §107 or § 106, then that party must
use § 113, otherwise that party must use § 107. The concern of
many circuits that § 113 would be swallowed whole by § 107, is no
119

New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122 (citing United Technologies, 33

F.3d at 101).
121

United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 100.
Id.

122

U.S. v. Colorado and Eastern R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10t Cir.

120

1995).
123

New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1123. "Allowing a potentially respon-

sible person to choose between §107 (with a six-year statute of limitations and
joint and several liability) and § 113(with a three-year statute of limitations and
apportioned liability based upon equitable considerations) would render § 113 a
nullity. Potentially responsible persons would quickly abandon § 113 in favor of
the substantially more generous provisions of § 107." Id.
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longer valid after Aviall because that decision stamped out the right
of non-PRPs to use § 113. Opinions based on the idea that Congress would not have enacted a meaningless provision are now on
shaky ground because the Supreme Court has effectively given
meaning to § 113 by distinguishing between actions commenced
by PRPs from actions commenced by innocent or non-guilty parties.
In applying this distinction, the court is changing the definition of PRP. Courts ignore the fact that owners, operators, arrangers and transporters of hazardous waste become "covered persons"
long before EPA adjudicates them as such. That is, as soon as a
party "accepts ... any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected
by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs," that person
becomes a PRP and they are a PRP whether EPA is aware of it or
not. 124 Thus, the distinction between the § 107 and § 113, after
Aviall, has come to be defined not by what it is, but by what it is
not. It is not based on the merits of the claim, but by the procedural
posture of the case. It is not based on the actual guilt of the party,
but by the parties' desire to settle with EPA. Prior attempts by
courts to say that § 107 is inherently an action by innocent parties
seeking the whole of their response costs and that § 113 is inherently an action by guilty parties to have the courts allocate their
respective harms have been superceded by an arbitrary distinction
that ignores principals of joint liability and of equity. Section 113
can now be defined as the remedy available to parties who have
been the subject of litigation with EPA. What should then follow is
that everyone else may use § 107.
2. A Better Route
The better analysis would have been for the court to take
the approach of the Ninth Circuit in Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corporation,that § 107 and § 113

124

42 U.S.C.A. §9607(A)(4)(2005).
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provide and regulate a PRPs right to
claim contribution from other
PRPs . . . while § 107 created the

right of contribution, the "machinery" of § 113 governs and regulates
such actions, providing the details
and explicit recognition that were
missing from the text of § 107 . . .
Sections 107 and 113 work together-the first section creating the
claim for contribution between PRPs,
and the second25 qualifying the nature
of that claim.'

This analysis suggests that the implied cause of action generally
accepted to have arisen under §107 is inherently one for contribution, and the §113 governs the way PRPs should use such an action.
"Section 113(f) . . . does not create the right of contribution-

rather the source of a contribution claim is section 107(a). Under
CERCLA's scheme, § 107 governs liability, while section 113(f)
creates a mechanism for apportioning that liability among responsible parties."' 126 Courts which agree that § 107 and § 113 provide
"similar and overlapping" remedies take the position that contribution is but species of cost recovery.' While the remedies are similar and overlapping, this is not to say that parties seeking recovery
under § 107 are limited to actions commenced during or following
a civil action as dictated by the most recent requirements of § 113
claims. Pinal Creek supports the idea that § 107 alone creates a
cause of action. 128

The distinction between the two concepts has generated
volumes of litigation over the past twenty-five years; attempts to
pin down the meanings of the terms "cost-recovery" and "contribu125

Pinal Creek Corp. v. Newmont Mining, 118 F.3d 1298, 1302 (citing

New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122, "[§]113 does not in itself create any new
liabilities; rather, it confirms the right of a [PRP] under § 107 to obtain contribution from other [PRPs]", and citing United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 102 n. 10).
United States v. ASARCO, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D. Colo. 1993).
126
Key-Tronic, 511 U.S. at 817.
127
Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1302.
128
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tion." The reality is that the two concepts are inextricably intertwined and attempts to separate them have yielded undesirable results. Prior to Aviall, it would have made sense to say that guilty
parties should use § 113 and innocent parties should use § 107.
Now, however, where the court has placed an irrational distinction
between those who have settled with EPA and those who have not,
it has excluded a group of plaintiffs from any remedy whatsoever.
decision has ensured that "no good deed goes unpunThe Court's
1 29
ished."
C. Impacts of Barring PRPs from § 107
This situation could be remedied, however, if the equitable
allocation of harm available under § 113 were also available under
§ 107. Innocent parties would not be harmed because the court
would apportion no liability to them, and guilty parties that have
not settled with EPA would not be harmed because the court would
apportion the harm between the guilty parties, regardless of
whether the plaintiff had settled with EPA. Supporters of limiting
PRPs to § 113 contend that the present arrangement encourages
parties to settle with EPA. 130 This may be the case, but inducing
parties into settlement agreements with EPA is ethically questionable, but also has some practical legal considerations.
There are two competing theories concerning the effect that
the Aviall decision will have on the speed and costs of the discovery and remediation of sites. One theory is that the decision this
will cause a rush on EPA to enter into settlement agreements so
that parties will be able to use § 113.131 Under this theory, the vast
bureaucracy under which EPA operates will inevitably be overwhelmed by an inundation of new work. 132 A second theory is that
the decision will have a chilling effect on voluntary cleanup because parties will fear the inability to recover their response
129
Richard G. Leland, Court Decision Shows No Good Deed Goes Unpunished, REAL ESTATE WEEKLY, Feb. 2, 2005.
John S. Gray, Reinventing CERCLA: Will The Supreme Court Overturn
130

20 Years Of Settled Contribution PracticeIn Aviall Services Inc. v. Cooper Industries?, 17-12 MEALEY'S POLLUTION LIABILITY REPORT 31 (Sept. 2004).
131
132

Id.
Id.
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costs. 133

The dangers of this are tremendous, among them are severe environmental degradation and significant financial losses.
1. Effect on Voluntary Cleanup
The clear concern expressed by respondents in Aviall was
that CERCLA's purpose and legislative history was "to encourage
parties to undertake cleanups voluntarily, without the need for
government compulsion or intervention."' 34 While the Court eventually abandoned the legislative history of CERCLA, which articulated the importance of the voluntary cleanup, self-policing has
played a very important role in the remediation of many contaminated sites.' 35 Voluntary cleanups only stand to become more useful as the Superfund dwindles. Although the most recent Supreme
Court case to hear this issue renounced the importance of this aspect of CERCLA's legislative history, the encouragement of Voluntary cleanup is well settled to be beneficial to the environment
and to EPA in carrying out CERCLA's ultimate goal: the remediation of contaminated sites. Supporters of voluntary cleanup feared
they know
that parties will not conduct voluntary cleanups when
136
costs.
cleanup
their
recover
to
able
be
not
will
they
Parties who have determined that a privately conducted
cleanup would benefit them now must weigh that concern against
the possibility of recovering costs. "The relative speed and costeffectiveness of a voluntary cleanup must be balanced against the
risk that costs will not be recoverable. These risks must be further
balanced against the risk of inviting enforcement from state environmental agencies." 137 The end result of this dilemma is that par133

Id.; Brief of Respondent at 26-27, Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Services,

125 S.Ct. 577(2004)(No. 02-1192), 2004 WL 768554.

134

Id. at 26.

135

Douglas McLeod, Superfund Lawsuits Limited, Common Pollution

Cleanup Action Barred, 38 BUSINESS INSURANCE, 1-2 (Dec. 20, 2004) "The

ruling eliminates a type of cost recovery action that has been successfully pursued in scores of cases since the mid-1980s by companies engaged in private
cleanups." Id.
136
Brief of Respondent supra note 133, at 10.
137

Robert Longstreth, Supreme Court Decision Imperils Voluntary Envi-

ronmental Cleanups, Mondaq Business Briefing, Mar. 4, 2005, 2005 WLNR

3312112.

58

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL 13

ties are forced to play a waiting game with EPA and their relevant
state agencies. Parties take a gamble on the likelihood that contamination will go undiscovered, allowing contaminated sites to
languish and deteriorate further. This can lead to increased response costs and general environmental degradation, both of which
should be avoided in favor of swift, voluntary cleanups where parties may recover the costs regardless of their status as PRPs.
2. Economic Considerations
Aside from the detrimental impact this will have on the environment, the Superfund will also suffer from PRPs that hold out
for EPA to come to them. The longer a site sits without remedial or
removal action taken, often the response costs can increase because
of the greater environmental degradation over time. The National
Priorities List exists precisely to remedy this problem; that is, the
worst sites, those that threaten most "human health and the environment" get cleaned up first.' In 1994, EPA had a backlog of
about 5,500 sites for which it had to determine eligibility for the
Superfund program.t 39 For NPL sites, the average time from listing
to completion of remedy is twelve years. 140 For a contaminated site,

the journey from discovery to remedy can be a long one, even
where the contamination is considered time-critical. The likelihood
that EPA will actively seek new sites which it can place at the bottom of a five thousand site backlog is minimal, particularly where
the Superfund is not recovering enough costs to cover the sites it
has already selected.14 1 By the time EPA discovers the contaminated site, the cost can be significantly higher than it may have
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U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Role of Cost in the Super-

fund Remedy Selection Process, Sept. 1996, Exhibit 2. See supra note 44, for a
discussion of the National Priorities List.
139
United States General Accounting Office, Superfund Program Management at 24, Feb. 1995, hereinafter "GAO report."
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KATHERINE N. PROBST, ET. AL, FOOTING
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CLEANUPS: WHO PAYS AND How? 18 (The Brookings Institution 1995).
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Id. The GAO report assessed the weaknesses of the Superfund program.
One of the biggest problems, the report claims, is the failure of EPA to recover
the costs of cleanup from the responsible parties.
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been had the party conducted the cleanup or taken its problem to
EPA initially.
Even where EPA makes efforts to address the most time
critical sites first, there is evidence that this is not always the case.
The General Accounting Office (GAO), in its Superfund Program
Management recommendations, found that despite EPA's policy of
addressing the worst sites first, the EPA tended to accept the sites
that had been awaiting review the longest or sites for which it has
the most complete data. 142 EPA made little use of data that would
determine the risk to human health and the environment, but based
its determination of Superfund eligibility on how long a site has
been waiting for acceptance. 43 Even though EPA should address
the worst problems first, the GAO report indicates that this is not
always the case. 144 Unfortunately, the most threatening sites can
also be the most expensive to cleanup. The Superfund and the
other PRP's will ultimately bear this cost.
a. Effect on the Superfund
Barring this group of plaintiffs from any remedy also creates an unfair draw on the Superfund by parties that wait for EPA
to come to them, and then enter into "mixed funding" agreements.
Mixed-funding agreements allow EPA to "reimburse the parties to
the agreement from the [Super]Fund, with interest, for certain costs
of actions under the agreement that the parties have agreed to perform but which the [EPA] has agreed to finance."' 145 Where EPA
enters into a settlement with a PRP pursuant to § 122, the Superfund can bear escalated response costs incurred as a result of the
PRPs delayed reporting or the EPA's delayed discovery of the site.
Increases in costs can be the result of increased environmental
damages due to lack of remedial or removal actions in time critical
sites. The situation is exacerbated when the site has multiple PRPs
that are either insolvent or no longer a legal entity capable of being
142
143

Id.

Id.
Id., See also, PROBST ET. AL, supra note 3 at 39. For FY 1999, of 52
sites proposed for listing on the NPL, 21 of them had been proposed for more
than five years.
145 42 U.S.C.A. §9622(b)(1)(West 2005).
144
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taken into court. Shares of liability, called "orphan shares," that
would be apportioned to insolvent or unavailable PRPs are apportioned to other PRPs or absorbed
by the Superfund, where the PRP
146
cleanup.
the
perform
agrees to
EPA will "compensate" parties that
agree to perform a remedial action or
non-time-critical removal for a portion of the share specifically attributable to insolvent or defunct PRPs...
These limitations were included because they moderate the impact on
the Trust Fund and minimize the incurrence of additional transaction
costs, particularly with respect
to
47
1
share.
orphan
the
of
calculation
The orphan share program was initially implemented to "reduce
litigation, encourage PRPs to perform cleanup, and to enhance the
overall fairness of the Superfund program," and it was limited in
1999 to mitigate the high transaction costs associated with calculation of the orphan shares. 148 The limitations implemented by EPA
indicate the financial significance that orphan shares have on the
Superfund. For Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997, the EPA did not

146

Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator Office
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(June
3,
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http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund
/orphanshare-rpt.pdf.
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Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency to Regional Administrators, Regions I - X at 3, Transmittal of Addendum to the "Interim CECLA Statement Policy" Issued on Dec. 5, 1984, Sept. 30,
1997,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/addensettle-mem.pdf.
148
Id.
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charge parties for 49.1 million dollars of orphan shares. 149 This
amount stands to increase as the amount of available, solvent PRPs
decreases. While allowing guilty parties to use § 107 will certainly
not decrease transaction costs associated with cleanups, it will reduce the amount of PRP's that become insolvent by allowing parties to sue other PRPs at any time.
Where EPA often bases its decision to remediate a site
based on how long that site has been pending acceptance to the
program, new sites can often take years to make into EPA's backlogged program. As time progresses, PRP's become insolvent and
disappear, creating orphan shares which must be paid by jointly
and severally liable parties or from the Superfund. Both liable parties and the Superfund will suffer when it takes years for EPA to
discover a site, place it on a list and finally accept that site into the
Superfund program.
b. Effect of Settlement Protection
Another aggravating factor for non-settling plaintiffs
caused by delays in site discovery and remediation is the unavailability of plaintiffs that enter into protective agreements with EPA.
Settlement agreements play an important role in actions for contribution for several reasons. In addition to determining which cost
recovery provision a party must pursue, settlement status also determines whether or not defendants will continue to be liable,
which is particularly important in a joint and several liability
scheme. A non-settling plaintiff suing two jointly and severally
liable, settling defendants will be the only onebearing any liability.
Section 113(f)(2) provides that "a person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State . . .shall not be liable for
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement."' 15 Thus, under CERCLA's express contribution protection
provision, a person that settles with EPA as plaintiff in separate
litigation is not liable for contribution to future plaintiffs.
149

U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and

Program Risks: Environmental Protection Agency,
http://www.gao.gov/pas/cg99017.pdf.
150
42 U.S.C.A. §9613(f)(2)(2005).
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In Azco Coatings v. Aigner, the Seventh Circuit held that
Azco's action was inherently one for contribution because it had
contributed to the contamination of the site. 151 Azco was then
barred from an action for contribution with respect to matters covered in the settlement, which in this case were all costs of a voluntary remedial action.' 52 Azco could not pursue an action for contribution because the defendant had settled with EPA and received
contribution protection and was also foreclosed from cost recovery
action under § 107(a). Because § 122(g)(5) precludes non-settling
parties for suing settling parties for contribution, parties like Azco
have no remedy.' 5 3 It is very likely that more situations like this
will arise.
The longer it takes for EPA to discover a site, the more
likely it is that other PRPs will be unavailable or insolvent. The
clean-up costs will increase because of the time the contamination
went unreported and the shares apportioned to each PRP will be
more. Whether the Superfund is absorbing the cost, or the settling
PRPs end up paying, it is an unnecessary cost associated with waiting for EPA to discover the contamination.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR § 107
The above-stated impacts could be eliminated if parties who have
contributed to contamination yet conducted cleanups before settling with EPA could pursue actions for cost recovery under § 107.
Such parties could undertake voluntary cleanup without the fear
that they would not be able to recoup any of their costs, because
they would be able to do so under § 107. The courts would allocate
the harm equitably as it would do in any other case where the
plaintiffs are asking for an equitable allocation of harm. This is
feasible, legally justifiable, environmentally and fiscally responsible.
151

Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 770.

152

Id. at 770.

153

"A party who has resolved its liability to the United States under this
subsection shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement." 42 U.S.C.A. §9622(g)(5)(2005); see also Dravo Corp.
v. Zuber, 13 F.3d 1222, 1225(8" Cir. 1994).
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A. The Language of § 107 Permits Use by Non-Innocent Parties
The language of § 107(a)(4)(B) clearly states that "any person.., shall be liable for.. .any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person..." 154 Facially, this statute appears
to create liability in any person causing response costs to be incurred to any other person. Thus, any person who has incurred re55
sponse costs can sue any other person to recover those costs.'
When the court in Asarco reasoned that the savings clause of § 107
preserves the private right of action, it created an implied riht of
action for private individuals to recover their response costs.' 6 The
Congressional response to cases like Asarco was to adopt the theory that, although CERLCA's text implied a private right of action,
an express right of action would "clarify and confirm" that CERCLA provided such a cause of action.' 57 Thus, while the SARA
amendments codified an express cause of action with § 113, they
did not create this authority. The cause of action existed before §
113, and it continues to exist today.
Even the majority in Aviall recognized that § 107 alone
created an implied cause of action for contribution.' 58 The Court
cited the 1982 District Court opinion in City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chemical, which held that "a party which has incurred response costs [and] seeks to recover them from [the] responsible
parties, [has] an action expressly authorized by CERCLA."'' 5 9 The
majority in Aviall recognized that subsequent District Court cases,
Asarco and U.S. v. New Castle, affirmed that CERCLA did in fact,
infer a right to contribution from joint tortfeasors.160 The only relevant Supreme Court authority, as the majority would have it, is two
154

42 U.S.C.A. §9607(2005).

Pinal Creek, 6; United States v. ONeil, 11 F.3d 292, 295 (1st Cir.1993);
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 n. 3 (9th Cir.1986).
155

156
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Aviall, 125 S.Ct. at 581.
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cases dealing with statutes other than CERCLA, where the Court
failed to imply a common law right of contribution between joint
tortfeasors.1 In Northwest Airlines, the Court held that where the
legislative history permits, the Court could infer such a cause of
action. 162 The Supreme Court never decided whether or not there
was an implied cause of action under §107 alone.
The only courts to hear this precise issue before Congress
enacted the SARA amendments were the District Courts, which
interpreted the statute to create a private right of action among parties that had incurred response costs regardless of whether those
parties had been the subject of litigation with EPA or whether that
party was guilty or innocent. The Court in Stepan Chemical called
such a distinctions "theoretical inconsistencies," and refused to bar
the action based on the "hypothetical possibility" that the plaintiff
had been the subject of state or federal litigation.' 63 This issue became moot as soon as the SARA amendments were passed because
PRP's no longer needed to rely on the implied cause of action
where Congress had set forth an express cause in § 113. Thus the
issue was never decided by the Supreme Court.
While many courts have held that non-innocent parties are
limited to actions for contribution under § 113(f), there is a substantial body of case law that permits non-innocent parties to proceed under § 107.164 In Bethlehem Iron Works, the court held that a
non-innocent party could pursue an action to recover its costs under § 107. 165 The Oshtemo court agreed when it held that even a
party that could sue for contribution was entitled to use § 107.166
There exists support for the idea that non-innocent plaintiffs may
bring actions for cost recovery. These cases have new life after
Aviall. These and other cases holding that actions between PRPs
are inherently ones for contribution were decided based on the
161

Aviall, 125 S.Ct. at 581 (citing Texas Industries v. Radcliffe Materials,

Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638-639 and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers,
451 U.S. at 90-99.)
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availability of actions for contribution to non-innocent parties that
had voluntarily incurred response costs. 167 Now, courts must reevaluate the availability of § 107 where § 113 is not available. The
only foreseeable possibility68 is the door left open by Justice Ginsburg in her Aviall dissent.1
B. Equitable Allocation of Harm Is Available under § 107
Because the Supreme Court hinted at the availability of §
107 as a remedy for non-innocent PRPs like Aviall, it is still a possibility for many parties who have and will undertake voluntary
cleanups. The mechanics of its implementation are still unclear.
Until now, courts that allowed guilty parties to recover response
costs have allowed them to pursue such action under § 113.169
Where courts were reluctant to allow non-innocent parties the
remedies afforded under § 107, this now remains the only option.
One criticism of this approach is that if parties could choose between the two provisions, then they would choose § 107's substantially more generous provisions . If plaintiffs could make this decision, then § 107 would swallow up § 113 and no one would use §
113.170 While this is a valid concern, fear that a certain statutory
provision will be abandoned is not a justifiable reason on its own
to foreclose a cause of action entirely to a certain group of plaintiffs, particularly those in who have acted in good faith.
Many courts conclude that non-innocent parties are not entitled to joint and several liability, and that they should be limited
to § 113's several liability. 17' However, it is not necessarily the
case that liability under § 113 is several only. While the burden
remains on the defendant to implead third parties that it feels share
in the liability, those parties are subject to the equitable allocation

167
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Azco, 30 F.3d at 764; Bedford v. Sills, 156 F.3d at 424.
Aviall, 125 S.Ct. at 594.
United Technologies, 33 F.3d 96; Western Properties Service Corp. v.
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of harms by the court. 17 2 Further, a finding that non-innocent parties are not entitled to joint and several liability runs contrary to the
original legislative intent that imputed strict, joint and several liability to parties liable under CERCLA. 7i 3 This liability scheme
appeared long before the SARA amendments added § 113.
It is feasible to allow non-innocent parties access to § 107
and to urge the courts to equitably allocate the harms in those cases.
Where an innocent party seeks an allocation of such harm, if it is
truly innocent than the court will allocate none of the response
costs to it. In PVO Internationalv. Drew Chemical Corp., the District of New Jersey held that it should allocate cleanup costs under
a § 107 claim using the "relevant equitable factors." 174 PVO conducted approximately one million dollars worth of investigatory
work on its property pursuant to a consent decree entered into with
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
("NJDEP"), but it maintained that it had only caused "an unspecified but 'minimal' amount" of the chemical disposal that brought
the site to NJDEP's attention. 75 The court held that "Congress
clearly intended courts to allocate cleanup costs between liable
parties, and it would be anomalous to allocate such responsibility
in contribution actions but to allow it to fall only on defendants in
§ 107(a) actions, regardless of any partial responsibility of the
plaintiff in contaminating the property.. ." and it was accordingly
bound to equitably allocate the harm between Drew and PVO.17

42 U.S.C.A. §9613(f)(1980; U.S. v. Davis, 31 F. Supp 2d 45.
S. Rep. No. 96-848, supra note 53 at 187.
174
PVO v. Drew Chemical Corp., 19 ELR 20,077, 20,080 (D.N.J. 1988).
175
Id. at 20,078-79. The Court found insufficient information to determine
whether PVO was an innocent purchaser. Where today PVO may have been
eligible for the de micromis exception, this exception was not available at the
time this case was decided. See 42 U.S.C.A §9607 (o).
176
PVO, 19 ELR at 20,080. In U.S. v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 416
(D.N.J. 1991), the court agreed with its decision from three years prior, affirming the notion that Congress intended for the courts to equitably apportion harm
in §107 cases and noting that the "structure of CERCLA does not preclude consideration of equitable factors, including the liability of a PRP who was (or is)
plaintiff in a section 107 action." The court also suggested that such an interpretation be limited to cases where the defendants in the § 107 action could not seek
172
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When Congress enacted CERCLA, it drew from "principals
of evolving common law" like emerging laws of products liability. 177 Some scholars even pose the idea that Courts or Congress
should incorporate principals of comparative fault. 178 The Restatement Third of Torts: Apportionment of Liability is silent as to
whether a party must be involved in civil litigation to preserve its
right to contribution.' 79 Section 23 indicates that there is an express
right to contribution where the defendant has extinguished its liability through settlement or judgment against it, but the Restatement remains silent as to whether settlement or judgment is a requirement for contribution. 180 The use of § 113's equitable allocation of response costs or the adoption of recent developments in
comparative fault would allow innocent and non-innocent parties
to use § 107 to maintain an equitable allocation of response costs
accrued without having to enter into settlements with EPA or relevant state agencies. It would provide parties that have already begun cleanups in reliance upon § 113 as a remedy to pursue an action for direct cost recovery under § 107. This creates an incentive
for voluntary cleanup and effective means for courts to resolve the
issue of whether non-innocent parties have access to § 107's longer
statute of limitations. Innocent parties and those who have voluntarily complied with federal and state environmental laws should
have access to the more permissive provisions of § 107.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Aviall foreclosed a group of
plaintiffs from a remedy that has long been guarantied joint tort177

Colo. v. ASARCO, 608 F. Supp at 1459 (quoting 126 Cong. Rec.
30,932 (1980); S. Rep. No. 96-848, supra note 53 at 187).
178
Jose R. Allen argues that "under both CERCLA § 107(a) and § 113(f)
courts have the power to reduce a defendant's liability-and thereby reduce a
plaintiffs recovery-by resorting to evolving common law and statutory principles of comparative fault." Allen, supra note 65 at 13.
179
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, §23 (2000).
180
Id. "When two or more persons are or may be liable for the same harm
and one of them discharges the liability of another by settlement or discharge of
judgment, the person discharging the liability is entitled to recover contribution
from the other, unless the other previously had a valid settlement and release
from the plaintiff." Id.
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feasors causing indivisible harm: the right of contribution from
other tortfeasors who have not incurred the costs of that harm.
Such a right existed in the original language of the statute as it
passed Congress in 1980. Section 107's language coupled with
evolving principals of common law dictate that non-innocent parties should be permitted to use § 107 for contribution and courts
should equitably allocate the harm between all such parties. The
adverse impacts of forcing parties into settlement with EPA are as
numerous as the benefits of encouraging self policing through voluntary cleanup. While this note does not seek to overturn the Aviall
decision, it does suggest that in the future, courts should revisit the
relationship between CERCLA's cost recovery provisions with an
eye towards resolving the dilemma created by Aviall.

